U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Corrections

Inmate Behavior Management:
Brazos County Jail Case Study

December 2013

Scott Hoke, Ph.D.

Message from the Director

Violence, vandalism, and other unwanted inmate behaviors prevail in many jails nationwide, and they frustrate jail practitioners who must ensure the safety and security of inmates, staff, and the public. Jail environments are one of the few environments in our communities where this type of behavior is expected and accepted. The environment created by these behaviors should not be considered acceptable, and it is jail administrators' responsibility to operate their facilities in a way that prevents these behaviors from occurring.

Effectively managing inmate behavior creates a safer environment for inmates and staff and allows the jail to provide a valuable service to the public. Community safety is enhanced by strong jail management, and facilities should aspire to create environments where compliance, respect, and cooperation are fostered.

In an attempt to create a system of strong management, the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) introduced an initiative that was designed to teach administrators, managers, and corrections officers the most effective methods to control inmate behavior and optimize operational efficiency. NIC calls the initiative Inmate Behavior Management or IBM. The comprehensive management system has six identifiable elements that work together to control inmate behavior and create an efficient and effective organization (Hutchinson, Keller, and Reid 2009):

1. Assessing risks and needs
2. Assigning inmates to housing
3. Meeting inmates' basic needs
4. Defining and conveying expectations for inmates
5. Supervising inmates
6. Keeping inmates productively occupied

Inmate Behavior Management: Brazos County Jail Case Study provides an example of how one facility planned and implemented the IBM management system and transitioned to a philosophy that refused to accept negative behavior as a natural result of the process of confinement. The experiences and results detailed in this report can be considered a valuable resource for any jail administrator who wants to make similar changes.

This report is a tribute to the dedicated staff and administration at the Brazos County, TX Sheriff's Office. The vision provided by the administration and the hard work given by the staff is proof that any organization can positively influence the conditions of confinement and the quality of a correctional work environment.

Morris L. Thigpen
Director
National Institute of Corrections

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NIC
National Institute of Corrections

Chapter 1: *Inmate Behavior Management: A Case Study in Successful Implementation*

PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT

The goal of this document is to provide an example of how one facility successfully implemented the Inmate Behavior Management (IBM) operating system. Organizational change of this magnitude can, at times, be seen as overwhelming and it is helpful to learn how other facilities have managed organizational change of this magnitude. As a comprehensive operating system, IBM may require a significant level of planning and evaluation. The lessons learned in Brazos County, Texas, and the strategies identified by the County's administration in that jurisdiction can serve as a reference or guide for any facility. While every jail in the United States stands unique, the process of organizational change is often very similar, allowing one to benefit from the experiences of others. Although anyone interested in making organizational change can benefit from this document, it is primarily intended to serve as a guide for readers who maintain some familiarity with the IBM system and are considering the program's implementation.

This document demonstrates that the implementation of organizational change is a process, not an event (Fixen et al. 2005) only accomplished through careful planning and preparation, which in most instances takes months.

REVIEW OF THE IBM PHILOSOPHY

Effectively managing inmate behavior is critical to providing a safe and secure environment for everybody within the jail's confines (Hutchinson, Keller, and Reid 2009). Traditionally, though, jails control inmates through physical containment—relying on bars, locks, steel doors and furnishings, security glass, alarm systems, and various restraints to achieve security. Staff safety depended on maintaining physical barriers between staff and inmates, with little interaction and no expectations to manage the inmates' behavior.

"One study reports that the rate of assault for a male inmate is 18 times higher than it is for a male in the general, non-incarcerated population and 27 times higher for a female inmate (Wolff et al. 2007)."

Although confined to their cellblocks, inmates to a large degree remained unsupervised and uncontrolled. As a result, jails stood neither safe nor secure. Much of the research into the area of inmate misconduct suggests that the level of violence and disorder that occurs in correctional facilities far exceeds the level of violence and disorder that occurs in the general community (Hewitt, Poole, and Regoli 1984; McCorkle 1992; Wolff et al. 2007). One study reports that the rate of assault for a male inmate is 18 times higher than it is for a male in the general, non-incarcerated population and 27 times higher for a female inmate (Wolff et al. 2007).

Over the past three decades, however, jail practitioners have begun to implement more effective approaches to achieving safety and security. Two major developments serve as keys to advances in the area of increasing safety and security in jail. First, the establishment of objective inmate classification systems enables jails to more effectively assess the risks and needs that individual inmates present and to separate inmates into more manageable groups. Separation of inmates based on risk and need assessment has been shown to reduce the amount of inmate violence and disorder (Austin 1993; Austin, Baird, and Neuenfeldt 1993; Brennan 1993).

Second, podular direct supervision prompted many jail practitioners to rethink their fundamental beliefs about jail design and operations. Podular direct supervision jails combine an inmate management strategy with a specific jail design to convey positive expectations of inmate behavior, facilitate extensive staff interaction with inmates, and promote management of inmate behavior. In these jails, an officer is stationed within the inmate dayrooms with no physical barriers between the officer and the inmates. The officer serves as the authoritarian on the unit, interacts continuously with inmates and manages them in a way that promotes positive behavior. Jurisdictions that fully implemented the principles of podular direct supervision experience significant reduction in negative inmate behavior (Bayens, Williams, and Smykla 1997; Farbstein and Wener 1989; Wener 2006; Wener, Frazier, and Farbstein 1987).

Although many local jurisdictions with newly constructed jails opt for direct supervision, most older jails were constructed with emphasis on physical containment and no expectations for staff to interact with and manage inmates. Without a comprehensive management system, these jails continue to experience high levels of negative inmate behavior. Also, some jurisdictions with direct supervision jails choose not to fully implement the inmate management strategy for which these jails were designed. As a result, these jails continue to experience the types of negative inmate behavior commonly seen in traditional jails.

“Podular direct supervision jails combine an inmate management strategy with a specific jail design to convey positive expectations of inmate behavior, facilitate extensive staff interaction with inmates, and promote management of inmate behavior.”

In 2004, the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) introduced the concept of inmate behavior management to help all jails, regardless of design, achieve their fundamental goal of maintaining a safe and secure environment. IBM serves as a comprehensive approach, combining multiple managerial elements into one operational system.

The comprehensive management system has six identifiable elements that work together to control inmate behavior and create an efficient and effective organization (Hutchinson, V., Keller, K., and Reid T. 2009). These six elements are identified as:

1. Assessing risks and needs
2. Assigning inmates to housing
3. Meeting inmates’ basic needs
4. Defining and conveying expectations for inmates
5. Supervising inmates
6. Keeping inmates productively occupied

Although this document does not serve as a detailed understanding of the IBM system (see Hutchinson, V., Keller, K., and Reid T. 2009), it focuses on the process of implementation. The following showcases how Brazos County managed the process and identifies the key elements present in their model.

For more information on the Inmate Behavior Management system:
Hutchinson, V., Keller, K., and Reid T. 2009. Inmate Behavior Management: The Keys to a Safe and Secure Jail.

Chapter 2: *Implementation Design*

SITE DESCRIPTION

Brazos County provides an example of how strong organizational management strategies overcome the weaknesses of a poor jail design. When the study was conducted, Brazos County had one of the most restrictive designs imaginable with respect to inmate supervision. Although the County recently moved into a new direct supervision facility, the design detailed in this report posed significant physical challenges to officer-inmate interaction. The jail administration, however, did not use design as an excuse and felt that strong management practices could regulate inmate behavior.

Brazos County maintained an average daily population of slightly more than 400 inmates during the period covered by this study, housed in two distinct facilities: one small facility located at the courthouse and the main detention facility located next to the sheriff's office. The courthouse facility and some of the housing units at the main detention facility gave the visitor the sensation of being on a submarine, with steel-riveted walls lining the corridors. Not visible to the officers from the hallway, the inmates in these units could only be seen by lifting a viewing panel located in the hallway, or by entering the clustered units. Constructed in a dormitory style, the large majority of housing contained anywhere between 10 and 30 inmates per unit.

Officials in Brazos County chose to implement the IBM system facility-wide, as compared to the unit-specific approach chosen by some facilities. The facility command believed a single operational approach proved more effective and less confusing than operating two distinct styles.

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

Assessing Inmate Risks and Needs

Defining and Conveying Expectations

Supervising Inmates

Post-Implementation Monitoring

This portion of the document details how officials in Brazos County approached the implementation process with respect to some of the individual elements. While they certainly paid attention to each of the six elements in the process of planning and implementing the IBM system, this report details only the three elements perceived as critical to the transition's success. Other highlights include Brazos County's post-implementation evaluation strategies.

Assessing Inmate Risks and Needs

The first critical decision made relative to the IBM system's implementation correlated with the concepts found in the element of assessing inmates' risks and needs. Prior to implementation, Brazos County officials used what they described as a complicated point-additive system to classify the inmate population. The administration found this system ineffective at identifying predatory and potentially vulnerable inmates. This system, for example, would classify nearly 40 percent of the population as maximum custody. Though possible in some extreme cases, classifying 40 percent of the population as predatory is most unlikely. The resulting process of over-classification undoubtedly placed more dangerous inmates in contact with more vulnerable ones, leading to unnecessary exposure. As a result, the administration changed instruments to more effectively identify the characteristics of the inmate population.

This decision demonstrates that the assessment of an inmate's risk and need serves as the first element in the IBM system, building on the foundation upon which the strength of the other elements stand. If staff does not effectively separate vulnerable and predatory inmates, then the control of inmate behavior becomes much more difficult. The literature on the benefits of effective classification clearly (Austin 1993; Austin, Baird, and Neuenfeldt 1993; Brennan 1993) demonstrates that separation of potentially violent inmates from those who appear more vulnerable reduces many types of unwanted behavior. Classification systems that fail to assist in identifying and separating inmates based on their level of risk cannot serve as a foundation for a strong system of behavior management.

In Brazos County, the effective identification of inmate types received a higher priority given the challenges faced by the poor architectural design. Separating inmates into groups according to risk takes on greater importance when a facility challenges staff in observing behavior. Simply suggesting that one follows a classification system without evaluating its effectiveness at identifying predatory inmates does not suffice for the control of inmate behavior. Research shows that using an inefficient classification instrument can lead to greater numbers of inmate infractions (Austin 1993).

“This decision demonstrates that the assessment of an inmate's risk and need serves as the first element in the IBM system, building on the foundation upon which the strength of the other elements stand. If staff does not effectively separate vulnerable and predatory inmates, then the control of inmate behavior becomes much more difficult.”

Defining and Conveying Expectations

This particular element often proves more difficult to implement for many agencies than originally envisioned. The reason is twofold. First, as a group of individuals, each employee brings their own set of behavioral expectations to the jail environment with rarely uniform expectations. "Acceptable behavior" varies from individual to individual, often making consistent enforcement of facility rules difficult. Secondly, some employees do not believe their role includes behavior management. This lack of a management attitude often leads to a reactive approach to supervision, in which security staff simply wait for negative behavior to occur instead of trying to prevent it.

Brazos County allowed security staff to select the behavioral standards inmates needed to heed as one way to counterbalance the potential differences in officer expectations and lack of management attitude. While any group of administrators could sit in a room and dictate a set of behavioral standards they felt best suited the needs of the institution, this approach empowered the officers to determine those that they felt most important and those safest to enforce. Brazos officials recognized making the officers part of the process strengthened the goal of the uniform enforcement of a set of behavioral expectations.

This does not suggest that the administration serves a minimal role in establishing behavioral expectations, as the process does require oversight to ensure expectations remain consistent with the IBM philosophy. In Brazos County, the administration reviewed the behavioral expectations on several occasions, ensuring that the phrasing of the expectations remained more positive than negative. The administration's approach emphasized the importance to establish positive behavioral expectations rather than create a simple list of prohibited behaviors that one typically finds in many institutions. Rather than a restatement of the misconduct codes, these behavioral expectations served as more general expectations of how staff wanted inmates to behave.

Another important facet of this element resides in deciding whether or not the behavioral expectations will be standard or varied. Standard behavioral expectations means that staff enforces one set of behavioral expectations upon the entire institution, suggesting that the same positive behavior is expected from everyone. Varied behavioral expectations means that the behavioral expectations differ from unit to unit based on variants such as the nature of the inmate, the level of responsibility given to the inmates, and the specialized organization of the unit. With no industry best practice established as it relates to this issue, a facility should choose the method that best fits the needs of the organization.

Acceptable behavior:	**Varies from individual to individual, often making consistent enforcement of facility rules difficult**
Varied behavioral expectations:	**Behavioral expectations differ from unit to unit based on variants such as the nature of the inmate, the level of responsibility given to the inmates, and the specialized organization of the unit.**

Brazos County decided to adopt a standard set of behavioral expectations. The security staff also determined that those behavioral expectations would serve as the basis for the inmate orientation process. When staff admitted an inmate to a housing unit, the officer would review the behavioral expectations to educate the inmate regarding expectations. Staff felt that having one set of behavioral expectations allowed for a greater level of consistency, as the inmate hears the same orientation on a number of occasions, depending on the frequency of housing assignment changes. In addition, one set of behavioral expectations allows for better understanding among the officers. Consistency strengthens a facility that lacks a post rotation system, allows officers to work the same post for an extended period of time, or uses overtime routinely to fill many of the posts on a given shift.

*Exhibit 1: **Brazos County Standard of Offender Behavioral Expectations***

Supervising Inmates

As simplistic as it may sound, one of the most critical decisions made by officials in Brazos County was the determination to actively supervise inmates in spite of the architectural design of the facilities. In many facilities where design prevents officers from seeing, hearing, and interacting with the inmates, many believed that active supervision cannot be effectively accomplished. Officials in Brazos County did not believe this and attempted to implement an active style of supervision despite the challenges the design presented.

Implementing an active supervision system presents more complications than one might imagine—especially if the officers lack experience with having extended contact with inmates and behavior management. This makes developing a sound training regimen extremely important. Fortunately, Brazos County provided supervision training to its staff on a number of issues that supported the behavioral management process.

The more challenging aspect of implementing an active supervision system in an architectural style that limits fluid officer-inmate interaction is structuring and encouraging a greater amount of contact. Officers entering a housing unit without a clearly defined purpose may feel awkward. Possible strategies to encourage contact and build confidence include requiring that ancillary functions such as mail distribution, med pass observation, and the distribution of commissary are performed in the housing unit rather than unit door. Officers in limited-contact facilities, performed many of these functions with the standing watch at the cellblock door, never entering the unit or interacting with the inmate population. Each time the officer enters the unit provides an opportunity to interact with an inmate in a positive manner.

Officials in Brazos also instructed officers to enter the unit several times during the course of their shift simply to answer inmate questions. In many institutions, inmates hand out request slips freely, with officers never making an attempt to answer even the most basic of their questions. This change in operation lead to extended periods of officer-inmate contact and allowed inmates to see officers as knowledgeable and approachable.

Post-Implementation Monitoring

Many of the jails NIC works with make attempts to monitor the implementation process and Brazos County proved no exception. But their interest in auditing the sustainability of the IBM system sets Brazos apart. Once a facility successfully implements organizational change, the challenge moves to maintaining the integrity of the changes, which may prove more difficult. Brazos County officials proved eager to prevent the tendency to backslide to patterns of behavior typical prior to implementation.

The desire to avoid backsliding resulted in the development of a sustainability audit as displayed in exhibit 2. An auditing instrument allows agencies to customize the evaluation contents to meet their individual needs. The IBM system is not an off-the-shelf style system; rather it allows agencies to tailor its individual elements in a manner that best fits their needs. The instrument comprises three major parts: the identification of core functions or tasks, a compliance rating of those functions or tasks, and specifications warranted corrective action.

Exhibit 2: Sustainability Auditing Tool

IBM AUDIT SUSTAINABILITY AUDIT			RATE THESE ITEMS ON LEVEL OF P & P COMPLIANCE: 1. Completed consistently. 2. Completed with some exception. 3. Completed inconsistently. 4. Not completed. 5. Not implemented.					IDENTIFY CORRECTIVE ACTION: 1. Staff training. 2. Improvement in staff supervision. 3. Modifications needed to policy and procedures. 4. Action plan needed.			
ELEMENT 1: ASSESSING AN INMATE'S RISK AND NEEDS			OBSERVE		DIALOGUE		DOCUMENT REVIEW				
☐		Is a booking triage form completed on each new inmate?	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4
☐											
☐											
☐		Does the inmate receive an orientation by the booking officer that explains the behavioral expectation to him or her?	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4
☐											
☐											
☐			☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4
☐											
☐											
☐			☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4
☐											
☐											
1 ELEMENT 1: ASSESSING AN INMATE'S RISK AND NEEDS											

The rating system, in the middle section of the tool, consists of five possible responses. As initially created, the instrument would only require the auditor to make free-text comments if assigned a score of 3 through 5 to the task. However, auditors can make a free-text comment at any time if they feel it is helpful. The final section requires identification regarding how to address any operational deficiency. If a score of 3 through 5 is given to a task in section 2, then the auditor must identify how to best address the deficiency: through staff training, improvements to current staff training, modifications to policy and procedure or through the development of an action plan.

As a frame of reference, the initial audit conducted in Brazos County contained at least 15 core functions or tasks in each of the six elements. Some are easier to audit than others, as some elemental functions reside more centrally than others. As an example, in auditing the functions or tasks identified under Element 1, it may be possible to complete the entire assessment never leaving the booking/receiving area. Many facilities concentrate the classification process in the jail's intake section, requiring that all core functions take place before inmates move to general housing. Other elements, such as Element 3 (Meeting Basic Needs), more evenly distribute throughout the institution and require the auditor to examine the maintenance process, the commissary system, visitation, food service, property distribution, and any additional services provided.

During the initial audit in Brazos County, staff observed that the auditing tool could serve in a number of different ways. The supervisor of any given function or division, such as the classification supervisor, can use the auditing tool to ensure the accuracy of the division's process or tasks. The classification supervisor may want to know how to complete the intake/booking triage form. The operational policy may state that the arresting officer's jail staff ask the triage questions. If true, how the staff completes the triage form may be of importance to the unit supervisor but not the facility. Other possibilities include that the area or function supervisor could maintain a more detailed auditing tool than the one conducted by the facility administrator. Also, staff may more frequently update the more detailed audit than the more comprehensive audit completed by the facility administrator. Regardless of how the facility uses the instrument, the intent remains to determine the level of sustainability.

When identifying core functions or tasks, each agency should identify what operational elements contribute to sustainability. As an example, in evaluating the core functions associated with the first element—the assessment of risk and need— one might determine that conducting a triage assessment at the point of admission is an essential function to the success of the element. Under Element 1 in the free-text field, one would write "Is a booking triage form completed on each new inmate?" The icons to the left of the free-text field are designed to identify the three ways in which auditing the task to verify its completion: the first is through visual observation, the second through interviews or discussions with staff, and the third through the production of a document, report, or review of statistics. Any one of the forms can serve as a measure of task compliance, but it is recommended that the auditor should attempt to assess the task using at least two of the three measures. The use of multiple measures to assess compliance, known as triangulation (Creswell and Clark 2007; Gibbs 2007), serves to provide a more accurate evaluation of the level of completion.

Visual observation

Interviews or discussions

Production of a document, report, or review of statistics

SUMMARY

The evaluation of the process observed at Brazos County presents many suggestions:

1. ENSURE THE QUALITY OF THE INITIAL CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT – Assessing risk and need serves as a critical element in the successful control of inmate behavior. Agency administrators should make every attempt to assess whether the instrument they currently use adequately identifies predatory and vulnerable inmates. If the currently do not exercise an identification system, it is important to select one that adequately assesses risk.

2. ALLOW STAFF TO ESTABLISH BEHAVIORAL EXPECTATIONS – Establishing behavioral expectations and enforcing them uniformly and consistently accomplishes appropriate housing standards. The agency administrator should allow the housing unit staff to identify acceptable standards of behavior. The administrator's job is to structure positive expectations that comply with the IBM system's philosophy.

3. RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTIVE SUPERVISION – When agency administrators implement active supervision, regardless of the facility's architectural design, it increases measures of successful behavioral management. A poor design can create challenges for active supervision, but should not serve as a barrier preventing supervision. Place an emphasis on maximizing inmate contact and develop policies and procedures that force ancillary duties to occur in the unit.

4. CONDUCT POST-IMPLEMENTATION AND SUSTAINABILITY AUDITS – Once staff completes the implementation process, ensure that sustainability becomes a priority. Develop some type of sustainability audit and require accountability of issues as they arise so as to maintain its integrity.

5. IBM AS A FOUNDATION FOR PROBLEM ANALYSIS – The decision to use the IBM system as a way to analyze and solve problems served as one of the important changes in philosophy in Brazos County. Jails may quickly blame problems they encounter on inmate behavior, failing to recognize that staff behavior and organizational structure can contribute to these problems. Adopting the IBM model forces an agency to recognize that inmate behavior can be controlled and problems can be limited. When problems do occur, the system allows administrators to evaluate the factors that contribute to problematic behavior and institute changes designed to modify and regulate it.

RESULTS

The results presented in this report represent formal misconduct reports written between January 2005 and July 2010. They have been aggregated as monthly totals per 500 inmates. It was necessary to report the totals in this manner because the inmate population fluctuated during the study period. The reporting period ended July 31, 2010 because the county opened a new, direct supervision jail the following month and the results would be skewed by factors other than changes in the style of management.

Overall Misconduct

Exhibit 3 presents the total number of misconduct reports written from January 2005 through July 2010. Interestingly, the data shows a predictable pattern given the differences between operating systems. Immediately after IBM system implementation, a spike in the number of written misconduct reports occurred. In fact, officers issued 70 written misconducts the month following implementation. This is not unusual, however, and is even somewhat predictable given that the officers had limited contact with the inmates in the old management system and imposed few behavioral expectations. Several months into the implementation, after the process of enforcing behavioral expectations took hold, written misconduct reports declined.

The spike in misconduct written reports also highlights the value triangulation. It would have been easy for the jail administration to conclude that changes in the operating system negatively influenced inmate behavior based on a simple analysis of the numerical data in the months immediately following implementation. The jail administration, however, made an attempt to interview officers during the initial stages of implementation to determine perception of the changes in inmate behavior. During that period, officers reported positive changes in inmate behavior despite the spike in the number of written misconduct reports. This, along with their own independent observations, led administrators to believe that despite the observed spike, the impact on inmate behavior was positive. When collecting data on the initial transition to the IBM system at any facility data should be collected from numerous sources, including the housing unit officers, to ensure the most accurate depiction of housing unit conditions possible.

***Exhibit 3:** Written Misconduct Reports January 2005 – July 2010*



Predatory Misconducts

In addition to the number of overall inmate misconduct reports, the jail administration evaluated certain types of inmate behavior. One type, represented in exhibit 4, was predatory behavior. This behavioral category includes a number of misconducts, the most common being fighting and threatening. This was important because the jail administration believed the old classification instrument did a poor job of identifying predatory and vulnerable inmates. In evaluating the months immediately following implementation, a noticeable downward trend after the first month of implementation appears. This is a similar pattern to the overall number of written misconduct reports presented in exhibit 3.

***Exhibit 4:** Predatory Misconduct: January 2005 – July 2010*



Predatory misconduct is a combination of seven different misconduct codes:

1. Inciting a fight
2. Fighting
3. Inciting riotous behavior
4. Sexual solicitation
5. Sexual solidation
6. Threatening
7. Yelling at other inmates

Nuisance Behavior

Exhibit 5 presents the data for nuisance behavior, which is a measure of 24 different misconduct codes. Nuisance behavior is a broad category and covers behavior that is neither predatory, property related, involves the possession of contraband nor related to disrespect. Administrators created this measure after discussion with staff who felt that this type of behavior was particularly problematic. In this pattern, there is a noticeable upward trend of misconducts written over the years leading up to the implementation of the IBM system, while the early trend immediately after implementation is in a downward direction.

***Exhibit 5:** Nuisance Misconduct: January 2005 – July 2010*



Nuisance Behavior: **Nuisance behavior is a broad category and covers behavior that is neither predatory, property related, involves the possession of contraband nor related to disrespect.**

Disrespectful Behavior

The final set of measures, presented in exhibit 6, displays misconducts written for two misconduct codes relating to disrespect — one for disrespect to staff and the other for disrespect to inmates. This measure is important because one of the points of emphasis in the new behavioral expectations established by the officers in Brazos County was demonstration of respectful behavior. This exhibit depicts a noticeable change in the pattern of misconduct after the IBM system's implementation, with a distinct reduction in misconduct related to disrespect.

***Exhibit 6:** Misconducts Related to Disrespect: January 2005 – July 2010*



Summary

The data suggests that there was a change in the pattern of behavior after the IBM system's implementation. Given the short duration of the post-implementation study period, making definitive statements about the lasting impact the changes had on behavior proves difficult. However, the changes in pattern suggest a promising trend. The ability to categorize behavior into the types noted above demonstrates the depth of potential changes. The IBM system positively affected inmate behavior across a broad spectrum, which is one of the goals of any well-managed organizational system.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Jail Administrator Wayne Dicky, IBM project manager Jerry Barrett, and the entire staff of outstanding men and women at the Brazos County Department of Corrections for their dedication and tireless work on this project. Every person who worked on this initiative should feel a great deal of pride in the success that resulted from their efforts.

REFERENCES

Austin, J. 1993. "Objective Prison Classification Systems: A Review." In M. Nunan & J. A. Nichols (eds.), Classification: A Tool for Managing Today's Offenders. Arlington: Kirby Lithographic, pp. 95-107.

Austin, J., Baird, C., and Neuenfeldt, D. 1993. "Classification for Internal Management Purposes: The Washington Experience." In M. Nunan & J. A. Nichols (eds.), Classification: A Tool for Managing Today's Offenders. Arlington: Kirby Lithographic, pp. 71-94.

Bayens, G. J., Williams, J.J., and Smykla, J.O. 1997. "Jail Type and Inmate Behavior: A Longitudinal Analysis." Federal Probation 61(3): 54-59.

Brennan, T. 1993. "Risk Assessment: An Evaluation of Statistical Classification Methods." In M. Nunan & J.A. Nichols (eds.), Classification: A Tool for Managing Today's Offenders. Arlington: Kirby Lithographic, pp. 46-70.

Creswell, J. W., and Clarke, V. L. 2007. Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research. Los Angeles: Sage.

Farbstein, J., and Wener, R.E. 1989. A Comparison of Direct and Indirect Supervision Correctional Facilities. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Corrections.

Fixen, D.L., Naoom, S.F., Blase, K.A., Friedman, R.M., and Wallace, F. 2005. Implementation Research: A Synthesis of the Literature. Florida Mental Health Institute: University of South Florida.

Gibbs, G. 2007. Analyzing Qualitative Data. Los Angeles: Sage

Hewitt, J., Poole, E., and Regoli, R. 1984. "Self-reported and Observed Rule Breaking in Prison: A Look at Disciplinary Response." Justice Quarterly 1:437-447.

Hutchinson, V., Keller, K., and Reid, T. 2009. Inmate Behavior Management: The Keys to a Safe and Secure Jail. Washington, DC: National Institute of Corrections.

Krueger, R.A., and Casey, M.A. 2009. Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research, 4th ed. Los Angeles: Sage.

McCorkle, R.C. 1992. "Personal Precautions to Violence in Prison." Criminal Justice and Behavior 19(2):160-173.

Wener, R.E. 2006. "Effectiveness of the Direct Supervision System of Correctional Design and Management: A review of the Literature." Criminal Justice and Behavior 33(3):392-410.

Wener, R.E., Frazier, W., and Farbstein, J. 1987. "Building Better Jails." Psychology Today 21:40-47.

Wolff, N., Blitz, C.L., Shi, J., Siegel, J., and Bachman, R. 2007. "Physical Violence Inside Prisons: Rates of Victimization." Criminal Justice and Behavior 34(5):588-599.

Disclaimer

This document was funded by cooperative agreement number 11A08GKH1 from the National Institute of Corrections, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Feedback Survey Statement

The National Institute of Corrections values your feedback. Please follow the link below to complete a user feedback survey about this publication. Your responses will be used to assist us in continuing to provide you with high-quality learning and information materials.

http://NICIC.gov/Go/UserFeedback

Accession Number

NIC Accession Number 027703